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NOTES
FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES: A STATUTORY
PROPOSAL IN THE WAKE OF INTERNATIONAL
UNION, UA W v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.
Over the past few decades, rapidly changing technology has re-
sulted in the widespread use of new and exotic chemicals at the
workplace. Simultaneously, the number of women in the workforce
has increased dramatically. Fifty-six percent of all women now work
outside the home, compared with forty-three percent in 1970.1
Working women have been drawn to the growing sectors of the
economy: service sector jobs, light industry, laboratory work, and
automated data processing.2 These new jobs, however, often ex-
pose workers to potentially toxic chemicals.
Concerns about the effects of chemical exposure to fertile and
pregnant workers have led companies to adopt protective or exclu-
sionary policies in many areas of manufacturing. These policies,
often referred to as "fetal protection policies," typically exclude all
fertile women from work in hazardous areas, regardless of age or
childbearing plans. Companies increasingly have turned to these
policies in an effort to limit their own future liability at the expense
of equal employment opportunities for women.
Critics of fetal protection policies believe that these policies re-
inforce the perception of women as marginal workers and stereo-
type women as nurturers first and workers second. Congress only
recently outlawed "protective" employer policies for working wo-
men, 3 and many believe that the institution of broad exclusionary
policies based solely on a worker's sex threatens to re-create those
limitations of the past. As one author stated:
The historical reduction of women's role in life to a single dimen-
1 BNA SPECIAL REPORT, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT: THE COMPLETE HANDBOOK
ON DISCRIMINATION, MATERNITY LEAVE, HEALTH AND SAFETY 59 (1970) [hereinafter BNA
SPECIAL REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A WORKING WOMAN's GUIDE TO HER JOB RIGHTS
(1978).
2 BNA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 59.
3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans job discrimination on the basis of
sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). In addition, courts have held that state labor statutes
are subject to Title VII prohibitions on discrimination. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 968 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aft'd, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 946 (1973); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972).
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sion-vessel and nurturer for the next generation-resulted in the
sacrifice of tremendous human diversity of talent, predilection,
and personal aspiration. To the extent restrictions are imposed
today upon the normal, routine choices about women's work and
nonwork lifestyles, such historical limitations upon women's lives
are reimposed.4
Congress passed Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
combat these stereotypes. 5 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) of 1978 amended Tide VII, reinforcing the prohibition
against workplace discrimination of women with childbearing capa-
bility.6 Recently, women have challenged the legality of fetal pro-
tection policies under Tide VII, and courts have struggled to use
Tide VII jurisprudence to balance employer liability concerns and
fetal health against the rights of working women.
This Note demonstrates the inadequacy of Tide VII as a frame-
work for analyzing fetal protection policy cases. Part I outlines Tide
VII law and traces traditional Tide VII jurisprudence, as well as re-
cent Supreme Court changes to that jurisprudence. The Note fo-
cuses on International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc. ,7 a recent
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that altered the use of
Tide VII jurisprudence in fetal protection policy cases. The deci-
sion effectively prevents fetal protection policy plaintiffs from chal-
lenging exclusionary employment policies under Title VII. Johnson
Controls, presently pending before the Supreme Court, leaves little
room for compromise between company policies and the rights of
working women.
Part II briefly presents the current level of scientific knowledge
regarding workplace toxins. It then discusses fetal protection poli-
cies and cases, including Johnson Controls, explaining the rationale
behind the decisions and offering criticisms. Because the Seventh
4 Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. LJ. 641, 653 (1981).
Many scholars have addressed the relationship between fetal vulnerability policies at the
workplace and equal employment opportunity rights of women. See, e.g., Mary E.
Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219
(1986); Lucinda M. Finley, The Exclusion of Fertile Women From the Hazardous Workplace: The
Latest Example of Discriminatory Protective Policies, or a Legitimate, Neutral Response to an Emerg-
ing Social Problem?, 38 N.Y.U. ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 16-1 (1985); Hannah Arterian
Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Preg-
nancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA L. REV. 63 (1980); Linda
G. Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the Employment Rights of
Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1981).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 9-11 (legislative
history of Title VII).
6 Id § 2000e(k). For a discussion of the legislative history of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, see infra text accompanying notes 41-48.
7 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
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Circuit's decision has undermined the protections intended under
Title VII, and because Tide VII itself serves as an inadequate tool
for analyzing fetal protection policy cases, this Note proposes a fed-
eral statute to regulate workplace exclusionary policies.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Title VII
1. Rationale for Adoption and Explanation of Provisions
Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, sex, reli-
gious beliefs, or national origin in both hiring and employment
practices. Congress passed Tide VII to eliminate long-existing bar-
riers to employment for racial minorities. 9 Members of Congress
added the prohibition on sex discrimination as an afterthought in an
unsuccessful effort to defeat passage of the bill.10 Following enact-
ment of the bill into law, courts have vigorously defended the rights
of women against job discrimination. As in race discrimination
cases, courts have required that any employment criteria used by an
employer "must measure the person for the job and not the person
in the abstract."' 1 As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated, "the premise of Title VII . . . is that women are to be on
equal footing with men and equality of footing is established only if
employees otherwise entitled to a position, whether male or female,
are excluded only upon a showing of individual incapacity."' 12
Title VII violations fall into two categories. The first category,
"disparate treatment," occurs when an employer institutes a policy
which on its face discriminates against employees through forbid-
den means such as race or sex.' s The statutory language of Title
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
9 Furnish, supra note 4, at 74.
10 Id. at 74 & n.54; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES, AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1988).
11 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971); see also City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (in a sex discrimination case
barring employer discrimination based on "stereotyped" impressions about characteris-
tics of women, the Court required courts to focus on fairness to individuals rather than
on fairness to classes).
12 Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
13 In addition to policies which discriminate on their face against certain classes of
employees, an employee may attack policies which are neutral on their face but are a
pretext for overt discrimination. Both the facial discrimination and the pretext theories
are considered disparate treatment cases and, as such, are excused under Title VII only
by a bona fide occupational qualification defense. See infra note 14 for text of Title VII
statute; see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (an employer policy neu-
tral on its face violates Title VII if found to be a mere pretext for discrimination against
1112 [Vol. 75:1110
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VII explicitly prohibits disparate treatment. In addition, the statute
provides only one defense to an employer charged with disparate
treatment: the "bona fide occupational qualification" ("BFOQ')
defense.' 4 This defense allows employers to discriminate on the ba-
sis of religion, sex, or national origin only when those qualities are
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise."' 15 The Supreme Court held that the BFOQ
defense is meant to be an "extremely narrow exception to the general
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex."' 16 Accordingly,
courts have upheld sex discrimination on its face only in very limited
women); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (Title VII applies if
plaintiff can demonstrate that a policy is a mere "pretex[t] designed to effect an invidi-
ous discrimination against the members of one sex or the other").
14 The statute reads in relevant part:
Unlawful Employment Practices
(a) Employer Practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin....
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and em-
ploy employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bonafide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (emphasis added).
15 IA § 2000e-2(e).
16 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 347 (1977) (emphasis added) (sex of prison
guards in a maximum security prison determined to be a BFOQ); see also Rosenfeld, 444
F.2d 1219 (court held that employer who excluded women as a class per se for jobs that
required heavy lifting did not prove a BFOQ; employer did not prove that the sexual
characteristics of an employee were crucial to successful performance of thejob); Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendant tele-
phone company failed to prove that heavy lifting and otherjob requirements constituted
a BFOQ). In Weeks, the court stated that "Title VII rejects just this type of romantic
paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead vests individual women with the power to
decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks .... We cannot conclude that by
including the bona fide occupational qualification exception Congress intended to re-
nege on that promise." Id. at 235-36. But see Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and
Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (burden of proof placed on de-
fendants by the trial court in proving a BFOQwas held by the Court of Appeals as too
demanding), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133 (1989).
Cases discussing the BFOQ defense under the Age Discrimination Act include:
Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (mandatory retirement at age 60 for
airline pilots held to be a BFOQ); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353 (1985)
(mandatory retirement age for firefighters does not automatically constitute a BFOQin
an age discrimination case).
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situations. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found sex discrimination acceptable only "when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of
one sex exclusively."' 7
The second category of discriminatory practice is the "disparate
impact" theory in which an employer institutes a policy that appears
neutral on its face but discriminates in effect against certain employ-
ees on the basis of their race, sex, or religion. The disparate impact
analysis is a judicially created theory that first emerged in the 1972
Supreme Court decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' The Court in
Griggs also created a "business necessity" defense to the disparate
impact theory, a defense less stringent than the statutory BFOQde-
fense. To utilize this defense successfully, an employer must show
job relatedness: the requirement at issue must have "a manifest re-
lationship to the employment in question."' 9
An example of a policy with disparate impact would be an em-
ployer who required all employees to be at least five feet, six inches
tall. The policy would affect men and women equally, but it would
have a disparate impact upon women by excluding a great number
of women and a relatively small number of men. An employer could
use the business necessity defense successfully if he could prove, for
example, that all equipment on the job in question could only be
operated safely by persons over the height of five feet, six inches.
2. Traditional Title VII Burdens of Proof
In cases alleging disparate treatment, the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of proof throughout the proceedings. Within this category, Ti-
tle VII requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of intent to
discriminate under the challenged employment policy.20 The de-
fendant-employer must articulate a BFOQ defense to justify an al-
leged discriminatory policy. If the defendant produces a legitimate
rationale as a defense for its policy, then the plaintiff must prove
17 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
18 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The defendant in Griggs used nonjob-related diploma re-
quirements and "intelligence testing" requirements for candidates seeking employment
in skilled jobs. The tests, although neutral on their face, had a discriminatory impact on
the employee population by systematically excluding blacks. The Supreme Court ruled
that even though Title VII proscribed only overt discrimination, the intent of the Act
was to remove all past employment barriers for minorities. Consequently, the Court
ruled that neutral employer policies which worked in practice to exclude certain groups
of employees were illegal under Title VII. As the Court unanimously asserted, Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
19 Id. at 432.
20 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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that the defendant's policy and rationale are only a pretext for
discrimination. 21
Initially, the burden-of-proof standard in disparate impact cases
was different from the burden-of-proof standard in disparate treat-
ment cases. In disparate impact cases, the plaintiff first had to come
forward with proof of discriminatory impact of an employer's poli-
cies. Once this was done, the burden of proof switched to the de-
fendant in the form of an affirmative defense. Unlike disparate
treatment cases, the defendant had to do more than simply articu-
late a legitimate rationale for the policy. To escape liability, a
defendant-employer had to demonstrate that the policy was "neces-
sary to the safe and efficient operation of the business." 22 If the
defendant met this burden of proof, the plaintiff then had the op-
portunity to prove that other less discriminatory alternatives were
feasible. If the plaintiff succeeded in doing so, the employer's busi-
ness necessity defense disappeared. 23
For example, in terms of the hypothetical cited above, a plaintiff
would bear the burden of proving that an employer's minimum
height requirement of five feet, six inches had a disparate impact on
women. The employer would then have to demonstrate that the
height requirement was legitimately connected to his business
needs, and that there were no less discriminatory alternatives avail-
able. The plaintiff need not demonstrate anything; it remains with
the employer to provide evidence justifying the height requirement.
If the employer proves that a height minimum is necessary, then the
plaintiff has the opportunity to show that there may be feasible alter-
natives such as adjusting machinery or redistributing tasks on the
job.2 4 This burden-of-proof pattern in disparate impact cases had
21 See id. at 250; McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
22 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); accord Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
23 See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
24 Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
965 (1981), illustrates how the traditional business necessity defense worked in a sex
discrimination suit dealing with pregnancy. In Burwell, female flight attendants brought
suit against Eastern Air Lines for company pregnancy policies that grounded all preg-
nant flight attendants and forced forfeiture of those attendants' seniority. The court
held that although Eastern's policy appeared to be "neutral in its treatment of male and
female employees ... its impact was solely upon women.... depriving them of 'employ-
ment opportunities' and adversely affecting their status as employees ...." Id. at 364.
Thus, tojustify its policy, Eastern had to supply a legitimate business necessity rationale
as a defense. The test applied by the court was "whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business." Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). Eastern tried to prove that
grounding flight attendants in the first months of pregnancy constituted a legitimate
business purpose, but the court held that the only legitimate concern of the employer in
light of a "business necessity" was the safety of the passsengers. Accordingly, the court
allowed employers to ground flight attendants only in later months of pregnancy, after
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remained constant since its inception in 1972. Seventeen years
later, in 1989, the Supreme Court changed the proof pattern in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio 25 by requiring the plaintiff to bear
the burden of persuasion throughout the proceedings.
3. Burden of Proof in Disparate Impact Cases After Wards Cove
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court changed the burdens of
proof in disparate impact cases. The plaintiffs in Wards Cove were
employees at salmon canneries in Alaska who worked in unskilled
positions on the cannery production lines. A mix of Filipino and
Native Alaskan workers filled these cannery jobs, while mostly white
workers held the noncannery-line jobs at the plants. Noncannery-
line jobs were generally skilled positions that paid substantially
more than the minority-filled, cannery-line positions. Because of
the short canning season and the remote location of most of the
canneries, the cannery-line workers lived on location and ate in
company mess halls. The noncannery-line workers, however, lived
and ate in dormitories and dining halls separate from the minority
workers. 26
The plaintiffs brought suit against their employer under both
the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of Title VII
law, alleging that the company's hiring and promotion practices cre-
ated both a racial stratification of the workforce and denied minority
workers equal employment opportunities. After a bench trial, the
district court entered a judgment for the defendants. 27 The plain-
tiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
to hear the case en banc.28 Using the traditional Title VII analysis,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had proven a
the employer proved that an attendant in a late stage of pregnancy might indeed endan-
ger the safety of passengers in the event of an emergency. Id.
25 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
26 Id. at 2119-20.
27 The district court rejected the plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims. It then re-
jected the disparate impact claims which the plaintiffs raised regarding the defendants'
use of subjective employment criteria, believing that a disparate impact analysis could
not be applied to subjective employment criteria. Id. at 2120. The Supreme Court later
held in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988), that a disparate
impact analysis could indeed be applied to subjective employment criteria.
28 The Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc to resolve the controversy
over whether courts may apply a disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
criteria. In resolving the issue, the court also discussed the parties' respective burdens
of proof. The court then remanded the case to a panel. On remand, the panel found
that the plaintiffs had established a prima fade case of disparate impact and remanded
the case to the district court with instructions that "it was the employer's burden to
prove that any disparate impact caused by its hiring and employment practices was justi-
fied by business necessity." Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120. Before the district court
heard the case on remand, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.
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prima facie case of disparate impact through the use of statistics;
accordingly, the burden shifted to the employer to prove the busi-
ness necessity of the challenged policy.2 9 The defendants appealed
this finding to the Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's instruction regarding the
burden of proof in disparate impact cases. In doing so, the majority
revamped the traditional burden of proof pattern so that the burden
of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times in all disparate
impact cases.30
The Court's decision affected the rights of all discrimination
victims who use Title VII law to redress their wrongs. In addition to
proving that an employer's policy has a discriminatory effect on the
employee population, plaintiffs now must provide evidence that the
employer's given justification for the policy is not necessary to the
operation of the business. 31 Limited funds and limited access to
employer information and policy rationales make this task extraordi-
narily difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs. As the four dissent-
ing Justices wrote,3 2 the majority decision in Wards Cove not only
"[t]urn[ed] a blind eye to the meaning and purpose of Title VII,' '3 3
but also seriously damaged the effectiveness of the anti discrimina-
tion law by "depart[ing] from the body of law engendered by this
disparate-impact theory [and] reformulating the order of proof and
the weight of the parties' burdens."3 4 Justice Blackmun lamented
the Court's anti-plaintiff stance, noting that "[s]adly this comes as
no surprise. One wonders whether the majority still believes that
race discrimination.., is a problem in our society, or even remem-
bers that it ever was." '35
Allen v. Seidman,36 a racial discrimination case, demonstrates the
devastating effect of Wards Cove on a plaintiff's disparate impact
case. 37 In Allen, the plaintiffs sued the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) for using a "Program Evaluation" test to help
determine promotions. The plaintiffs asserted that the test was dis-
29 Id. at 2020.
30 Id. at 2126.
31 Id.
32 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. The majority con-
sisted of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White. Justice White
wrote the majority opinion.
33 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
34 Id. at 2136.
35 Id.
36 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
37 Judge Posner wrote that this case, along with another appeal, constituted "the
first disparate-impact appeals heard and decided by this court in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, which modified the
ground rules that most lower courts had followed in disparate-impact cases." Id. at 377
(citations omitted).
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criminatory in nature and consequently had a disparate impact on
FDIC minority employees. The district court, deciding the case
prior to Wards Cove, ruled for the plaintiffs after finding that the test
had a disparate impact on the plaintiffs and that the defendant failed
to demonstrate a business necessity justification. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, explaining that Wards Cove
switched the burdens of proof in Tide VII disparate impact cases.
In the majority opinion, Judge Posner noted that the term "business
necessity defense" was now a "misnomer," since the plaintiff must
carry the burden of persuasion and the defendant no longer must
bear the burden of an affirmative defense.38 The opinion also noted
that "[any] alternative[s] proposed by the plaintiff must be 'equally
effective as (the defendant's) chosen hiring procedures in achieving
(the defendant's) legitimate employment goals.' ,9 The Seventh
Circuit would echo these words less than three months later to dis-
miss a fetal protection policy case on summary judgment. 40
B. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
In 1976, in General Electric v. Gilbert,41 the plaintiffs sued an em-
ployer for instituting a disability plan that discriminated on the basis
of pregnancy. The Supreme Court upheld the plan under Title VII,
ruling that pregnancy-based discrimination did not constitute gen-
der-based discrimination within the meaning of Tide VII. The
Court based its rationale on the premise that the employer's policy
distinguished between pregnant women on the one hand and non-
pregnant women and men on the other. On these grounds, the pol-
icy did not discriminate on the basis of sex. Three dissenting
Justices disagreed, stating that "[bly definition, such a rule discrimi-
nates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant
which primarily differentiates the female from the male." 42
Congress reacted to the decision swiftly, the Court's holding in
Gilbert by passing an amendment to Title VII. Both the Senate and
House Reports that accompanied the amendment explicitly affirmed
the dissent's interpretation of Tide VII, asserting that discrimina-
tion based on pregnancy or the ability to become pregnant violated
Title VII.43 The amendment, known as the Pregnancy Discrimina-
38 Id. at 377.
39 Id. (quoting Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127).
40 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 892.
41 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
42 Id. at 161-62.
43 HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978) [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 948], reprinted in NEW 1978 PREGNANCY BENEFITS AND DISCRIMINATION
RULE WrrH EXPLANATION AND STATE SURVEY, 55 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) at 52-69 (1978);
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NOTE-FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES
tion Act ("PDA") of 1978, reads in part:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other per-
sons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,
and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted
to permit otherwise.44
The House Report stated that the purpose of the amendment was to
"ensure that working women are protected from all forms of em-
ployment discrimination based on sex." '45 The Senate Report out-
lined the same intent, asserting that the amendment would protect
women from any discriminatory policy based on their ability to be-
come pregnant. The Report noted:
"[t]he proscription of such policies is perhaps the most important
effect of this bill. For, as the history of sex discrimination shows,
such policies have long-term effects upon the careers of women
and account in a large part for the fact that women remain today
primarily in low-paying, dead-end jobs."'46
It is important to note that the PDA and its legislative history
Senate Comm. on Human Resources, Amending Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S.
Doc. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1978) [hereinafter S. Doc. No. 331], reprinted in
NEW, 1978 PREGNANCY BENEFITS AND DISCRIMINATION RuLEs WITH EXPLANATION AND
STATE SURVEY, 55 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) at 70-86 (1978).
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
45 H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 43, at 52. The report noted:
the consequences of... discriminatory employment policies on pregnant
women and women in general has historically had a persistent and harm-
ful effect upon their careers. Women are still subject to the stereotype
that all women are marginal workers. Until a woman passes the child-
bearing age, she is viewed by employers as potentially pregnant. There-
fore, the elimination of discrimination based on pregnancy in these em-
ployment practices . . . will go a long way toward providing equal
employment opportunities for women, the goal of Tide VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 6-7; see also Furnish, supra note 4, at 77-83 (discussing the legislative history of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment).
46 S. Doc. No. 331, supra note 43, at 6. The courts have embraced this interpreta-
tion of the Title VII amendment in pregnancy discrimination cases. In Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983), the Supreme Court held that
Congress had "unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the
reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision." Id. at 678. In a later case in which the
Court established that preferential treatment for pregnant workers was acceptable, the
Court stated that the "reports, debates, and hearings make abundantly clear that Con-
gress intended the PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act] to provide relief for working
women and to end discrimination against women workers." California Fed. Sav. & Loan
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285-86 (1987); see Scherr v. Woodland, 867 F.2d 974, 978 (7th
Cir. 1988) (stating that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act must be interpreted in light of
1990] 1119
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
contain little information regarding fetal protection policies.47 With
the amendment, Congress intended to eliminate all job discrimina-
tion based on both pregnancy and potential pregnancy, but the leg-
islative history does not indicate that Congress considered the effect
of toxic work environments on fertile employees when it passed the
Act.48
II
FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES
A. Scientific Evidence Regarding Fetal Hazards in the
Workplace
The negative effect of exposure to toxic substances varies little
between men and women.4 9 Although some toxic substances5 ° have
sex-specific effects,5 1 in general, "the reasoned hypothesis of special
the antidiscrimination context of Title VII, and not as "an independent statutory enact-
ment").
In addition to the courts' interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") also has interpreted the Act to
mean that employers may not use pregnancy as a rationale for "refusing to hire or pro-
mote an otherwise qualified woman, for forcing her to take maternity leave, for discharg-
ing her... or for failing to reinstate her." BNA SPECIL REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
47 See Furnish, supra note 4, at 77-83.
48 Id. According to Furnish, the United States Chamber of Commerce submitted a
short statement regarding potential fetal health problems to both the House and Senate
Committees. The statement outlined employer concerns about the prohibition of poli-
cies which excluded pregnant women. The statement read in part that:
[The Pregnancy Discrimination Act] would prevent an employer from re-
fusing certain work to a pregnant employee where such work arguably
posed a threat to the health of either the mother-to-be or her unborn
child. Even though the prospective mother might arguably be considered
to have assumed the risk by asking to work in such circumstances, injury
to the fetus might give the child a cause of action against the employer
who, under the bill, would be powerless to deny the work to the child's
mother during the pregnancy.
Id. at 78 n.72 (quoting .iscrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 482 (1977);
Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and
H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 84 (1977)). Furnish noted that Senator Hatch asked an
expert witness about the extent of expressed legislative concern. The expert responded
by noting that more research was needed to judge the effects of toxic substances on the
reproductive systems of men and women alike. Id. at 79 n.73.
49 Gary Z. Nothstein &Jeffery P. Ayres, Sex-Based Considerations of Differentiation in the
Workplace: Exploring the Biomedical Interface Between OSHA and Title VII, 26 Vir.. L. REv.
239, 243-48 (1980-81).
50 The toxicity of a substance is defined as the "inherent capacity of a substance to
cause injury to biological tissue." Id at 243 n. 11.
51 Toxic effects on reproductive organs differ between men and women primarily
because of differences in gonadal location and function. "Testes are more exposed to
hazards than ovaries by virtue of their location, but this is less significant than the fact
that sperm cells are always dividing and thus are more susceptible to mutations which
frequently occur during cell division." Id. at 244 n.13. Nothstein and Ayres also note
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susceptibility because of sex is largely without basis." 52 Although
exposure to toxins in the workplace at certain levels may be safe for
the normal health of men and women, such exposure could cause
harm to their reproductive systems and prove deadly to a fetus.
Toxic substances harm a fetus either by poisoning it directly ("ter-
atogens"), 53 or by affecting it indirectly through the alteration of the
chromosomes of either the male or female reproductive systems
("mutagens").54 Substances with teratogenic effects may harm a fe-
tus through the exposure of the mother, while substances with mu-
tagenic effects may harm a fetus through the exposure of either the
mother or the father. 55
A chemical may have a combination of teratogenic or muta-
genic effects; consequences vary according to the particular sub-
stance and the level of exposure.56 Known toxics with both
teratogenic and mutagenic effects include lead (used in gasoline,
that "[g]onads of both sexes have the same embryonic origin and thus a similar bio-
chemistry.... Thus, a toxic substance that affects the gonads of one sex, a mutagen,
probably will affect those of the other." Id. at 244-45 (footnotes omitted). Carbon disul-
fide, for example, "appears to interfere with gonadal endocrine function in both sexes,
resulting primarily in male impotency but also, to a lesser extent, in female menstrual
disorders." Id. at 245-46 (footnote omitted).
52 Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
53 Teratogenic effects on a fetus include "structural malformations, metabolic or
physiological dysfunctions, and psychological or behavioral alterations in infants, which
become evident at birth or in the immediate postnatal period. If the change results in
stillbirth or in-utero death, the effect is more properly called embryotoxic or fetotoxic."
Id. at 245 n.18. See generally ANDREA HRICKO, WORKING FOR YOUR LIFE: A WoMAN's
GUIDE TO JOB HAZARDS (1976).
54 Howard, supra note 4, at 802. Mutagens are substances that damage the genetic
material of both men and women. Scientists differentiate between two types of
mutagens, one which affects nongerm cells and may cause malignancy, and a second
which affects germ cells and may cause chromosomal mutagenesis. Nothstein & Ayres,
supra note 49, at 245 n.17. Mutagenic damage affecting chromosomal material may be of
greatest concern to society as a whole. As Nothstein and Ayres bluntly state, "cancer
dies with the employee. The effect of genetic damage, however, may persist for many
generations." Id. at 245 n.18; see Williams, supra note 4, at 659. For a general back-
ground on mutagens, see generally Claxton & Barry, Chemical Mutagenesis, An Emerging
Issue for Public Health, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1037 (1977).
55 Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 49, at 245 n.18 ("If a substance is strictly a ter-
atogen, only women's reproductive processes can be affected. Fetuses of wives of ex-
posed male employees, however, may also be affected by teratogens.").
56 Howard, supra note 4, at 802. For a laundry list of potential effects from harmful
levels of exposure, see Nicholas A. Ashford & Charles C. Caldart, The Control of Reproduc-
tive Hazards in the Workplace: A Prescription for Prevention, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523, 526-29
(1983) (outlining potential damage to both offspring and parents from exposure to tox-
ins at the workplace). For a summary of the results of a few studies done on the poten-
tial reproductive effects of toxic exposure, see BNA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 62-
67. This Report includes a word of warning regarding these results, noting that "[w]hile
many studies show such possible side effects, there are just as many, if not more, that
show none." Id. at 65. The Report further stated that many of the studies done "are not
scientifically valid, and others suffer from a lack of a sufficiently large study population
to accurately demonstrate problems among a particular group." Id.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
pigments, rubber, batteries, bullets, pipes and roofing materials);
vinyl chloride (used in plastics and rubbers); chloroprene; benzene
(used in paints, nylon, tires and detergents); ionizing radiation; an-
esthetic gases; carbon monoxide; mercury (used in thermometers,
dental fillings, mirrors, dyes, and neon lights); pesticides; and chlo-
rinated hydrocarbons. 57 Occupations that suffer exposure to these
elements range from traditionally male blue-collar jobs such as
steel-making and chemical production to traditionally female jobs
such as x-ray technicians, dental assistants, and word processing.
Accordingly, both parents have the potential to bring home harms
to future offspring from exposure at the workplace. 58
The lack of scientific evidence regarding the effect of chemicals
on the reproductive systems of both male and female workers com-
plicates the problem of articulating an adequate fetal protection pol-
icy.59 The potential adverse effects of most chemicals are
unknown. 60 Even in situations where it is likely that parental expo-
sure to chemicals causes a certain birth defect, it is often "difficult
... to determine which of these processes caused the birth defect or
for that matter, whether the defect was caused by a work-related ex-
posure, other toxic exposure, or chance." 6 1 Additionally, scientific
studies on this issue have focused on the effect of chemical exposure
to the fetus rather than to males or nonpregnant females, skewing
the information available on hazards to working persons as a class.
Studies that focus only on the reproductive problems of women
57 Howard, supra note 4, at 803-05; Williams, supra note 4, at 647.
58 "The point here is that exclusion of only women from agents that affect repro-
ductive capacity will not solve the problem of toxic effects. Male as well as female work-
ers must be protected from these toxic agents." Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 49, at
247.
59 Williams, supra note 4, at 661 (noting that a "problem for employers is that,
although information on maternal exposure is more readily available than that on pater-
nal exposure, there is a troubling absence of studies on either"). In 1987, one report
pronounced that "[v]ery few substances have been studied for their reproductive effects
and little is understood about the mechanisms through which adverse effects occur."
BNA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 64.
60 "[O]f the more than 70,000 known chemicals, only about 7,000 have been tested
for carcinogenicity, and even fewer have been tested for reproductive hazards." BNA
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 61. The Office of Technology Assessment reported:
What is known about reproductive health hazards is far outweighed by
what is unknown: most commercial chemicals have not been thoroughly
evaluated for their possible toxic effects on reproduction and develop-
ment.... There are consequently no reliable estimates as yet of the basic
measures of reproductive risk in the workplace-the number of workers
exposed to such hazards, their levels of exposure, and the toxicity of the
agents to which they are exposed.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS IN THE .WORK-
PLACE 184 (1985) (quoted in Becker, supra note 4, at 1235 n.77); see also Howard, supra
note 4, at 802; Williams, supra note 4, at 661.
61 Williams, supra note 4, at 657 (footnotes omitted).
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in the toxic environment may encourage companies to institute poli-
cies that affect women exclusively. 62 This in itself creates potentially
unfair discriminatory policies, for as one study noted:
it does not necessarily follow that women are more sensitive to the
action of any given agent. Where extensive data have been com-
piled on both sexes (e.g., for anesthetic gases and smelter emis-
sions), evidence has been found for adverse effects resulting from
exposure of both men and women, including some evidence for
adverse fetal effects following exposure of males.63
Exposure to lead can cause "decreased sexual drive, impotence, ste-
rility, and decreased ability to produce normal sperm" in men, but
fetal protection policies do not account for these hazards.64
To say that scientific studies are scanty is not to say, however,
that all negative effects of toxic substances are unknown. For exam-
ple, the toxic substance implicated in International Union, UA W v.
Johnson Controls was lead. 65 Lead is extremely dangerous to human
62 Professor Williams points out that there is a preconceived notion of an "exdu-
sive connection between birth defects and women who carry the offspring." Williams,
supra note 4, at 660. Professor Finley notes that scientific studies done on the effects of
toxic exposure focus far more on potential reproductive hazards to women than to men.
She states that the lack of studies on men "reflects the pervasive assumption that wo-
men, as the actual childbearers, are uniquely susceptible to harm, and that the health of
fetuses can be affected only through the mother. An additional reason why the male's
role in the reproductive process [is] ignored by scientific research ... is that paternal
effects are harder to trace and to ascertain." Finley, supra note 4, at 16-6.
Mutagenic toxics may alter genetic material in men, leading to birth defects; yet
employers who have mutagens in the workplace often ignore the potential effect on men
and close the workplace to women only. One employer who barred only women from a
workplace which exposed workers to mutagens stated:
In the production of electronic equipment there is no feasible way of pro-
tecting people from that type of exposure because of the necessity to pick
up these elements in your hands .... I refuse to hire girls who are of
possible childbearing age for that very reason. I tell them absolutely,
point blank, there is absolutely no way any of these girls is ever going to
work on any of our lines because of that potential hazard. I can't get
anyone to tell me what the hazard is, and in the absence of that I'm not
going to take a chance .... [F]rom what I hear there are chemicals that
are possibly mutagenic ....
PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA K-Q-4 to
K-Q-5 (Feb. 9-10, 1979) (quoted in Williams, supra note 4, at 660 n.125).
63 Ashford & Caldart, supra note 56, at 546 n.l 12 (quoting CLEMENT AssoCIATEs,
INC., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, CHEMICAL HAZARDS TO HUMAN REPRODUC-
rION (1981)).
64 Howard, supra note 4, at 803 (footnote omitted). Besides abnormalities in sperm
(which may cause birth defects), paternal exposure to workplace toxics may cause harm
to offspring by transmitting the toxins through sexual intercourse (lead often found in
the semen of exposed males), or by transmitting the hazards directly from a worker's
skin, hair and clothing. Becker, supra note 4, at 1237. See generally RICHARD L. NAEYE &
NEBIAT TAFARI, RISK FACTOR IN PREGNANCY AND DISEASES OF THE FErus AND NEWBORN
(1983). See also discussion on mutagens, supra notes 51, 54 & 56.
65 886 F.2d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 1989) (enbanc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
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health, even in moderate doses. 66 In addition, toleration levels for
lead exposure are much lower for young children and developing
fetuses than for adult men and women. 67 Lead attacks the human
nervous system, posing serious hazards to a developing brain.68
Lead-exposed fetuses are threatened with stillbirth, low birth
weight, and "retarded cognitive development which may result in
learning and behavioral disorders. '69 The fact that the human body
stores lead in soft tissues and bone further complicates the problem
of lead exposure;70 high levels of lead may remain in a worker's
bloodstream for a long period of time after removal of the worker
from a toxic area.71 This makes it difficult for women to plan
pregnancies while working, and it poses a real threat to fetuses in
unexpected or accidental pregnancies.
B. Exclusionary Policies
1. Background and Rationale
In the face of indeterminate evidence regarding the effects of
toxics on the reproductive health of workers, 72 more and more com-
panies exclude women from hazardous work areas. Motivated both
by concern over tort liability and concern for the health of future
generations, employers opt to close doors to women workers rather
than face potential liability for future injuries. By 1980, an esti-
mated 100,000 jobs excluded women of childbearing capacity be-
cause of fetal protection, 73 and the number currently is much
66 BNA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 205; see also text accompanying note 64.
67 Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 49, at 254 (noting that lead served as an abortion-
inducer many years ago). The scientific evidence as to the actual effect of lead on fetuses
varies. A California appellate court which addressed the same fetal protection policy
implicated in Johnson Controls noted that the medical evidence offered by both sides of
the issue differed as to "when and to what extent lead crosses the placenta." Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 169 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990). The experts in the California case differed as to whether lead was any
more harmful to fetuses and children than adults. Id. at 169 n.5. See generally William L.
Marcus & C. Richard Cothern, The Characteristics of an Adverse Effect: Using the Example of
Developing a Standard for Lead, in 16(4) DRUG METABoLIsM REVIEWS 423 (1985-86) (re-
viewing the scientific evidence regarding a safe standard for lead).
68 International Union, UAW v.Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. 309, 311 (E.D. Wis.
1988) (expert testimony given to the district court by the director of a Reproductive
Toxology Center), aft'd, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct.
1522 (1990).
69 Id.
70 Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 49, at 256.
71 Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 312 (A toxicologist from the Environmental De-
fense Fund testified that the turnover rate of lead in the bloodstream is about 100 days,
meaning that a subject in a lead-free environment will have a complete reduction in
blood-lead levels within one year.).
72 See supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
73 Williams, supra note 4, at 647. The Washington Post wrote that "[flederal em-
ployment officials estimate at least 100,000 jobs involving contacts with potential ter-
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higher.74 Interestingly, women are "excluded more often from tra-
ditionally male-intensive jobs than female-intensive jobs, even when
exposures are similar."' 75 Female workers are not excluded from
jobs with exposure to substances known to be a threat to reproduc-
tive organs and fetal health when those jobs rely primarily on a fe-
male labor force.76 Scholars have noted that women are covered by
exclusionary policies only when they are "perceived as marginal
members of the workforce. ' '77 As a general pattern, employers will
not employ women in toxic areas unless their need for a female la-
bor source outweighs their fear of tort liability.7 8
Scholars differ as to how realistic this fear of liability is. One
atogens are now closed to women, either because of corporate policies or through
subtle channeling of women away from those positions." Washington Post, Nov. 3,
1979, § A, at 6, col. 5 (quoted in Williams, supra note 4, at 647 n.30).
74 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Department of Labor, In-
terpretive Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards, 45
Fed. Reg. 7514 (proposed Feb. 1, 1980), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 (1981). The
report stated that "evidence indicates that as many as 20 million jobs involve exposure
in the workplace to alleged reproductive hazards." Id. at 7514 (quoted in Emily Buss,
Getting Beyond Discrimination: A Regulatory Solution to the Problem of Fetal Hazards in the Work-
place, 95 YALE L.J. 577, 579 n.8 (1986)).
75 Williams, supra note 4, at 649 (footnote omitted).
76 For example, the health care industry is notorious for exposing its workers to
fetal and reproductive dangers ranging from anesthetic gases to bacteria and viruses.
Seventy-five percent of all hospital and health care workers are women. Id. at 649 n.58.
Video display terminals present another reproductive health hazard to millions of wo-
men employed in clerical work. One report cites an example where four out of seven
video display terminal operators at the Toronto Star gave birth to children with birth
defects within a one-year span. BNA SPECrAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 58; see also Becker,
supra note 4, at 1219 (footnotes omitted) ("The scope of [fetal protection] policies is
influenced by the sexual composition of the work force. When the work force is predom-
inately male, some employers exclude all fertile women from hazardous jobs. When the
work force is predominately female, some employers exclude only pregnant women
from hazardous jobs."); Howard, supra note 4, at 798 n.3 ("It is instructive to note that
traditionally male-dominated industries have demonstrated concern for pregnancy out-
comes by excluding fertile women.... Exclusionary policies have not been adopted by
American employers in female-dominated industries, such as agriculture and textiles, in
which substantial numbers of female workers are exposed to similarly hazardous sub-
stances, including pesticides and certain hydrocarbons."). Other traditional "women's"
jobs which entail exposure to fetal hazards include laundry workers, dry cleaners, labo-
ratory technicians, and electronics workers, where "women form the backbone of the
production process." Robin Baker & Sharon Woodrow, The Clean Light Image of the Elec-
tronics Industry: Miracle or Mirage?, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE: WOMEN'S HEALTH HAZARDS ON
THE JOB AND AT HOME 21 (Wendy Chavkin ed. 1984).
77 Becker, supra note 4, at 1237; Furnish, supra note 4, at 123-24; Williams, supra
note 4, at 649.
78 Professor Becker points out that exclusionary policies have arisen almost entirely
in unionized industries with rigid pay scales. She notes generally that women employees
in these jobs are likely to be less attractive to an employer than men. Becker, supra note
4, at 1240. In addition to possible disruption of the workplace from adding women to
the labor force ("men in traditionally male jobs are [often] hostile to women as co-work-
ers .... Id.), employers in toxic industries must deal with providing alternative facilities
(such as washrooms and showers) and protective clothing and tools specially designed
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author asserted, "[u]nder general tort principles, . . . there would
seem to be no basis for holding an employer liable for fetal harm if
Title VII bans sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies, the employer
fully informs the woman of the risks, and the employer has not acted
in a negligent manner."' 79 Barring intentional infliction of harm or
gross negligence, the worker's compensation system handles claims
by the employee against the employer. It is generally agreed that
waivers for claims of gross or wanton negligence may not be upheld
against a worker.80 However, if an employer complies with disclo-
sure requirements and government standards for exposure levels,
gross negligence may be difficult to establish.
With employee claims limited by waivers and worker's compen-
sation, employer concern has focused on the threat of tort suits by
children born with birth defects.81 Yet despite employers' fears re-
garding the proliferation of such lawsuits, there has yet to be a sin-
gle award regarding prenatal injuries from maternal exposure to
toxics at the workplace.8 2 In these suits, the plaintiff must overcome
the problem of establishing causation. As one author wrote:
[a]ssume, for example, that the probability of a particular birth
defect occurring is generally two in 100, but that prenatal expo-
sure to a known toxic substance to which the mother was exposed
during pregnancy increases the probability to ten in 100. How
much help will this information be to the parents or their defec-
tive offspring when they bring suit? There is no way to prove that
this child is not one of the two in 100 who would otherwise have
been born with the defect or to prove that in fact the defect re-
sulted from the exposure.8 3
The lack of claims against employers for birth defects caused by
toxic exposure could be due either to a lack of awareness regarding
potential hazards, or to a genuine problem in establishing a rela-
for women. These facts suggest that employers in traditionally male blue-collar indus-
tries are likely to argue for exclusion based on financial considerations. Id.
79 Becker, supra note 4, at 1244 (footnotes omitted). Professor Finley asserts that
..an employer who has complied with OSHA exposure standards, otherwise made the
workplace as safe as reasonably possible for workers of both sexes, and fully warned
workers of the reproductive dangers, would probably escape tort liability." Finley, supra
note 4, at 16-37.
80 See sources cited supra note 79; W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEE-
TON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 68, at 482 n.22 (5th ed. 1984);
Becker, supra note 4, at 1244; Finley, supra note 4, at 16-37.
81 In 1979, the EPA administrator stated that waivers from female employees may
be an acceptable alternative, since the prohibition "is for their own protection .... A
consensual waiver would also insulate the employer from liability for claims asserted by
the employee. The rights of an injured child, however, cannot and indeed should not be
waived." O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1482 (1979).
82 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 914 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S.
Ct. 1522 (1990); Becker, supra note 4, at 1245-46; Williams, supra note 4, at 646.
83 Furnish, supra note 4, at 86.
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tionship between the exposure and the injury.8 4 At least one author
has asserted that the problems facing plaintiffs in proving employer
liability for injuries to offspring is so great that employer concerns
about liability may actually be a pretext for sex discrimination. 5
Ignoring the causation problems, employers still may limit their
liability for exposure hazards through alternative means. Every ju-
risdiction now permits suits by children who were injured as fetuses
by a third party.8 6 Less clear is the extent to which a parental waiver
may affect such a right. Most authors believe that courts would not
uphold such a waiver,87 although there are arguments to the con-
trary.88 Apparently, courts have yet to consider the issue of waiver
in the context of preconception or prenatal torts.8 9
In addition to waivers, states may adopt a statutory scheme to
limit the extent of the liability that an employer may face. Fetal re-
covery could be incorporated into worker's compensation coverage,
or industries could establish a pooled damage fund to pay compen-
satory damages to injured children. Whatever methods are used to
assuage employer concerns, a company policy that excludes all fer-
tile women from certain work environments is over-inclusive. Wo-
men are potentially pregnant persons, but not all women workers
will become pregnant.90 Exclusionary policies based on assump-
84 For example, assuming that a child suffering from birth defects could prove a
causal connection to lead, that child may have difficulty proving that the lead came from
parental exposure at the workplace since lead may be found in other elements such as
paint, cooking utensils, air, and water. Finley, supra note 4, at 16-39.
85 Williams, supra note 4, at 646 n.25.
86 Furnish, supra note 4, at 85 n.90. However, some states "may require the injury
to occur after the fetus is viable." Id. But see James L. Marketos, Tort Liability for Preconcep-
tion Injuries, 1978 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 69, 72-73 (1979) (stating that almost alljurisdictions
will allow recoveries for infants born alive regardless of when in the pregnancy the in-
jury occurred).
87 See, e.g., Vibiana M. Andrade, The Toxic Worhplace: Title VII Protection for the Poten-
tially Pregnant Person, 4 HAgv. WOMEN's L.J. 71, 99 (1981); Ashford & Caldart, supra note
56, at 556; Williams, supra note 4, at 646.
88 The law recognizes the right of parents to make decisions on behalf of their chil-
dren, even if the decision is one which would be detrimental to the interests of the child.
An example of this is courts allowing parents of severely retarded or deformed babies to
decide whether or not the hospital should keep the babies alive on life support systems
following birth. But cf. Huss v. Demott, 215 Kan. 450, 452, P.2d 743, 756 (1974) (one
parent cannot compromise a child's right to child support from another parent by set-
ding with the second parent independently); Doyle v. College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1209
(Me. 1979) (parent not allowed to waive a cause of action on behalf of a child for injuries
sustained by the child).
89 Williams, supra note 4, at 646 n.24. Professor Finley notes that nearly every case
granting relief for a prenatal tort has been based on breach of a duty to the mother.
Finley, supra note 4, at 16-37.
90 Studies estimate that "only one out of 5,000 women between 45 and 49 has a
child in any given year. For blue collar women over 30, the birth rate may be less than 2
percent." Becker, supra note 4, at 1233 (footnotes omitted). The older a woman worker
is, the less likely it is that she will bear children, for "[t]here is only a 0.38 percent
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tions of women as childbearers ignore the interests of women as
workers. As one scholar wrote: "it is as if [the employers] are stat-
ing that women's interests in employment are so weak that they are
easily trumped by the interests of beings who may never exist." 9'
2. Criticisms of Exclusionary Policies
The firing or exclusion of women from jobs with toxic exposure
actually may have a more detrimental effect on future generations
than the exposure of the worker herself. These jobs usually offer
not only higher wages, but also comprehensive health insurance for
the worker and her family. After all, "[w]ith an ever-greater propor-
tion of households headed by women and with an increasing pro-
portion of these households in poverty, entry into traditionally
male, high paying positions is important to women and their depen-
dents."92 As Judge Cudahy asked in his dissent in Johnson Controls,
probability that a woman employee between 40 and 44 will have a child in any given
year. For a woman between 45 and 49, there is only a 0.02 percent chance of a birth
during any given year." Id. Although these figures focus on the odds of a single woman
having a child in a particular year, they emphasize the fact that most women in the
workforce are not pregnant (and probably not contemplating pregnancy) and thus are
no more vulnerable to toxic reproductive effects than their male counterparts. This is
particularly true for women workers over the age of 30. According to the U.S. Bureau of
the Census, by age 34, "89% of all women have borne all of the children they expect to
bear." BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SUR-
vEy (March 1982), cited in Judith A. Scott, Keeping Women in Their Place: Exclusionary Policies
and Reproduction, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE, supra note 76, at 181.
Policies that apply to all fertile women assume that most working women in a given
area will become pregnant. Yet the probability of having a child varies greatly from
woman to woman, with factors depending on "family situation, age, number of existing
children, birth control method being used, attitudes towards abortion, and a host of
other factors." Becker, supra note 4, at 1232.
91 Becker, supra note 4, at 1232. These exclusionary policies against women do not
arise in a vacuum. Historically, "protective" legislation for women in the workplace has
been a part of our law for years. See Andrade, supra note 87, at 75. In 1905, the
Supreme Court upheld such regulations in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1905), cit-
ing the woman's role as nurturer as a legitimate rationale for state regulation of working
women's hours and wages. The Court wrote that because "[h]ealthy mothers are essen-
tial to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public
interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." Id. at 421.
Such exclusionary and regulatory laws were successfully challenged under Title VII. See
Andrade, supra note 87, at 77. Even with the law on their side, women still have a diffi-
cult time battling these policies in court, as many judges still hold preconceived notions
of women as child bearers and nurturers first, and workers second. See Becker, supra
note 4, at 1261. One of the dissenting Judges in Johnson Controls noted that "of the 12
federal judges to have considered this case to date, none has been female. This may be
quite significant because this case.., demands, in addition to command of the disem-
bodied rules, some insight into social reality." Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
92 Becker, supra note 4, at 1229-30. In addition to better coverage by health insur-
ance, Becker outlines other benefits associated with earning higher wages, noting:
a woman earning a higher wage may be less likely to live in an old, poorly
maintained apartment in which her children are are exposed to lead
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"[w]hat is the situation of the pregnant woman, unemployed or
working for the minimum wage and unprotected by health insur-
ance, in relation to her pregnant sister, exposed to an indeterminate
lead risk but well-fed, housed and doctored? Whose fetus is at
greater risk? Whose decision is this to make?" 93
Exclusionary policies particularly hurt women in low income ar-
eas, for often the only high salaried employment available in a given
area involves work in hazardous environments. 94 Exclusionary poli-
cies also hurt women in noneconomic ways. At an individual level,
"women's interest in employment opportunity involves more than
an interest in a particular job." 95 Women have an interest in
"avoiding the . . . psychological consequences of sex segregation,
and in achieving such personal fulfillment values as a sense of self-
sufficiency, a feeling that control over life choices is not limited by
an accident of birth, and a sense of oneself as a valuable contribut-
ing human being." 96 In addition, policies that take away a woman's
right to choose where to work smack of paternalism. They "assume
that women cannot be trusted to act responsibly" 97 by excluding
themselves or requesting a transfer if pregnancy is contemplated.
Most certainly, an individual woman can better decide about her
personal reproductive and work future than an employer enacting
sweeping policies.98
paint. Both the woman and her children more likely to suffer malnutri-
tion if she does not have a well-payingjob. For a pregnant woman, com-
muting by public transportation may be more hazardous to the fetus than
commuting by car;, a woman with a higher paying job is more likely to be
able to afford a car. Excessive heat can have detrimental effects on preg-
nancy, and a mother in a higher paying job is more likely to be able to
afford air conditioning.
Id. at 1231 (footnotes omitted).
93 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 902.
94 Williams, supra note 4, at 650-51 (noting the number of women who work for
compelling economic reasons, the lack of mobility for women who head over 50% of the
families in the nation below the poverty line, and the lack ofjob opportunity and mobil-
ity within traditionally economically depressed areas).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Alan Carlos Blanco, Fetal Protection Programs Under Title VII-Rebutting the Procrea-
tion Presumption, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 755, 766 (1985).
98 A California Court of Appeal had this to say about a fetal protection policy under
consideration:
The Company's policy is predicated upon the presumption that the
employer is better suited to safeguard the interests of a woman's future
offspring, should there be an unexpected pregnancy, than is the woman
herself-i.e., that society's interest in fetal safety is best served, not by
fully informing women of the risks involved and allowing them to make
informed choices, not by fixing the workplace, but rather by removing
from women the opportunity to make any choices in the matter at all.
Distilled to its essence, this is not discrimination based on "objective
differences" between men and women, it is discrimination based on cate-
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In formulating protection policies, "employers err systemati-
cally in favor of fetal safety." 99 A woman, armed with full knowl-
edge and awareness of potential fetal risk, has the ability to weigh
the options and decide for herself where she should work. Policies
should assume that an informed woman will behave as a rational
being and pick the options best for her and her offspring. As one
scholar noted, women are not prohibited from smoking and drink-
ing during pregnancy, and more evidence links fetal harm to these
activities than to toxic work environments. 100 In our society, a preg-
nant woman may choose the lifestyle she will live; she also should be
able to choose the place in which she will work.' 0
gorical, long ago discarded assumptions about the ability of women to
govern their sexuality and about the comparative ability of women to
make reasoned, informed choices.
However laudable the concern by businesses such as the Company
for the safety of the unborn, they may not effectuate their goals in that
regard at the expense of a woman's ability to obtain work for which she is
otherwise qualified.
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158,
178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (footnote omitted).
99 Becker, supra note 4, at 1241. Indeed, employers who refuse to hire any fertile
women may experience a windfall in two ways. Not only is there a diminishment in
concerns about potential future tort liability, see supra text accompanying notes 72-92,
but also they are excused from providing the necessarily costlier benefits to women
workers. As Professor Becker points out, "employers who self-insure medical coverage
for their employees, or those whose future insurance premiums depend on current
payouts, the pregnant worker is a very costly employee ...." Id. Thus, "[e]mployers
have no financial incentive to consider the advantages of employment to a woman, to
her living dependents, to her unborn and unconceived children, and to society." Id.
100 Id. at 1243. One might argue that fetal harm resulting from drinking and smok-
ing are costs that are borne by society as a whole, whereas fetal harm from maternal
toxic exposure are costs that are borne by employers. This argument ignores the fact
that employers will pass on to society the additional costs of employing women through
the prices of the products they sell. As one author wrote: "[g]iven Title VII's ban on
discrimination, why should women and their living dependents, any more than employ-
ers, bear the costs of safety for potential third parties?" Becker, supra note 4, at 1247.
101 All of this is not to say that fertile women have no interest in working in contami-
nant-free environments. Employers who give no option for exemptions from toxic
workplaces for fertile women have in essence made pregnancy a penalty. See Hannah
Arterian Furnish, Beyond Protection: Relevant Difference and Equality in the Toxic Work Envi-
ronment, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1, 20 (1987). A "safe" workplace as required under the
law should not mean "safe for men only." See Buss, supra note 74, at 590. For an excel-
lent article regarding the interests of working women in the face of the norm of the male
working world, and a perspective that offers a proposal for change, see Lucinda M. Fin-
ley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986). Employers must offer women a meaningful choice regard-
ing workplace environments; exclusionary policies that offer no room for compromise
are not an acceptable solution to reproductive hazards at the workplace.
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C. Fetal Protection Policy Cases10 2
1. Wright v. Olin Corp.
Wright v. Olin,1os the first fetal protection policy case to come
before a federal appellate court, reached the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in 1982. In Wright, the plaintiffs brought a
number of discrimination charges against defendant Olin Corpora-
tion, including a sex discrimination charge regarding the defend-
ant's "fetal vulnerability" program which barred all fertile women
from certain work areas.' 0 4 The policy in question classified all
work at the Olin plants into three categories: "restrictive" jobs re-
quiring contact with hazardous chemicals' 05 which excluded all wo-
men aged 5 to 63;106 "controlled" jobs requiring limited contact
with hazardous chemicals which excluded all women unless they
signed a waiver acknowledging risk; and "unrestricted" jobs which
were open to all women.107 The district court upheld the exclusion-
ary policies, and the plaintiffs appealed.' 08
The appellate court, after recognizing that "the problem of fit-
ting the fetal vulnerability program into .. .Tide VII litigation is
one of first impression with... any court of appeals,"' 09 conceded
that fetal protection policies do not fit well into the niches of Tide
VII law."t 0 Nonetheless, the Wright court forged ahead and struc-
tured tests based on the business necessity defense for the District
Court to apply on remand. The appellate court declared that Olin's
fertility policy was "facially neutral," constituting a case of disparate
impact on the plaintiff-employees justifiable by the defense of busi-
ness necessity."' Admitting that to label Olin's policy as facially
102 There were three fetal protection policy cases heard by federal appellate courts
prior to Johnson Contros. This Note will discuss two of them, Wright v. Olin Corp., 697
F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), and Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th
Cir. 1984). The third, Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982),
was a case in which a plaintiff, who was fired by her employer when she became
pregnant, successfully proved under Title VII that the employer used her pregnancy as a
pretext for intentional sex discrimination.
103 697 F.2d 1172.
104 Id. at 1176.
105 The court was unclear as to the exact chemicals implicated, but one known expo-
sure hazard was lead.
106 The appellate court opinion cites the policy as barring all women "age 5 through
63." Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182. Since it is hard to imagine that Olin Corporation hires
five-year-olds, one would assume that this is a typographical error.
107 Id. at 1183.
108 Id. at 1176.
109 Id. at 1184.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1185. For a discussion of Title VII law, see supra text accompanying notes
8-40.
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neutral "might be subject to logical dispute,"'1 2 the Fourth Circuit
nevertheless rejected the application of the overt discrimina-
tion/BFOQ defense model because it deemed it unfair to the
employer.113
In applying the test of business necessity, the court reached a
new level of creativity. Noting that in past cases discriminatory poli-
cies had been justified under "business necessity" in order to pro-
tect workers or third-party customers, 114 the court labeled all
fetuses as "licensees and invitees" also deserving protection at the
workplace as a business necessity. 51 5 After making this designation,
the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to deter-
mine if the interest of the employer in protecting the invitees or
licensees as a business necessity outweighed the Title VII interests
of the plaintiffs. On remand, the plaintiff class dropped out of the
case. The district court, after hearing only the defendant's argu-
ment, ruled that the exclusionary policy was valid under the appel-
late court's new Tide VII test. 1' 6 The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals later vacated the decision." 17
2. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital" 8
In Hayes, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit used a
different analysis from the one used by the Wright court to evaluate a
fetal protection policy under Tide VII. The plaintiff, an x-ray tech-
nician, brought suit against her employer for wrongful termination
because of her pregnancy. The plaintiff claimed that her firing was
illegal under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act," 9 and the hospital
defended by asserting that it could not find a workplace for the
112 Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186.
1 13 Id. at 1185 n.21. The court never mentioned the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA") in its decision. One would assume that the court was applying pre-PDA princi-
ples, since the Act explicitly decreed that employment differentiation based on preg-
nancy does not constitute facially neutral criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). For
discussion of the Pregancy Discrimination Act, see supra supra text accompanying notes
41-48.
114 Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189 (citing Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). The court in Burwell explicitly ruled that
concern for the safety of a fetus could not be used in the business necessity calculus
under Title VII, stating that "personal risk decisions not affecting business operations
are best left to individuals who are the targets of discrimination." Id. at 371.). For fur-
ther discussion of Burwell, see supra note 24.
115 Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189.
116 Buss, supra note 74, at 582 n.32.
117 Id.
118 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
119 Id. at 1546. It should be noted that the Wright court did not discuss the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act; thus, it was unclear whether the court "was applying pre- or
post- Pregnancy Discrimination Act principles." Id. at 1546 n.2. For discussion of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, see supra notes 41-48.
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plaintiff that was free of ionizing radiation.1 20
In its decision, the court noted that to fire the plaintiff based on
her pregnancy was "just as facially discriminatory under the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act as it would be to fire her solely because
she was black under Title VII. ' ' 121 Despite this pronouncement,
however, the court regarded the hospital's act of firing the plaintiff
for pregnancy as only a presumption of discrimination. The Hayes
court then allowed the employer to attempt to rebut this presump-
tion of discrimination by showing that even though its policy ap-
plied only to women, "the policy [was] neutral in the sense that it
effectively and equally protect[ed] the off-spring of all
employees." 22
The Hayes court held that the defendant-hospital was unable to
rebut the presumption of a discriminatory pregnancy policy, and
without further discussion, 123 the court applied the disparate im-
pact/business necessity test. 124 Under the disparate impact analysis,
the court held that the employer had successfully proved a defense
of business necessity,' 25 but it ruled that the plaintiff successfully
rebutted the business necessity defense by demonstrating that there
were less discriminatory alternatives available to the employer. 126
The court concluded by summing up its newly created test for fetal
protection policies, stating that if an employer enacts a fetal protec-
120 Hospital policy recommended that no pregnant employees be exposed to ioniz-
ing radiation at the workplace. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1546.
121 Id. at 1548.
122 Id. (emphasis added). The defendant-employer must demonstrate this by a
showing that there is both a substantial risk of harm from toxics which may affect preg-
nant or fertile women, and that the risk applies only to women, not to men. Id. If the
presumption of discrimination is not rebutted by the employer, then the only recourse
left open to the employer is the traditional BFOQ defense. Id. at 1549. As discussed
supra in text accompanying notes 14-17, the BFOQdefense is difficult to prove, for the
employer must demonstrate "a direct relationship between the policy and the actual abil-
ity of a pregnant or fertile female to perform her job." Id. (emphasis in original).
123 Id. at 1552. Because the hospital could not rebut the presumption of discrimina-
tion, the hospital's only defense was a BFOQ. However, the court never determined
whether or not a BFOQ was present; instead, it chose to apply the disparate im-
pact/business necessity analysis. Id. For a discussion of the different defenses available
under Tide VII, see supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
124 Id. at 1553. The court applied the disparate impact and business necessity analy-
sis "'automatically,' . . . mean[ing] simply that in the trial of a case such as this no
additional evidence need be introduced on these points, and the trial judge may proceed
to the next issue-whether there were acceptable alternative policies, discussed below-
without further analysis." Id at 1553 n.16.
125 The court forged new ground in the area of "business necessity" and held that
"fetal protection [is] a legitimate area of employer concern to which the business neces-
sity defense extends." Id. at 1552 n.14.
126 The Hayes court declared that for the plaintiff to rebut the employer's defense,
she must present proof of "acceptable alternative policies that would better accomplish
the purposes of promoting fetal health, or that would accomplish the purposes with a
less adverse impact on one sex." Id at 1553.
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tion policy, the policy "violates Title VII unless the employer shows
(1) that a substantial risk of harm exists and (2) that the risk is borne
only by members of one sex; and (3) the employee fails to show that
there are acceptable alternative policies that would have a lesser im-
pact on the affected sex." 127
The Wright and the Hayes decisions demonstrate how ill-suited
fetal protection policies are for Title VII analysis. Both courts ig-
nored the plain language and meaning of the pregnancy discrimina-
tion amendment to Title VII; under the amendment, workplace
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is prohibited. both by word
and intent of Congress. 128 Each court twisted a path around the
disparate treatment/BFOQ question in order to apply a disparate
impact analysis, allowing the employer to defend its fetal protection
policy as a business necessity. 129 The decisions distort Title VII law
127 Id. at 1554.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 41-48 for discussion of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act.
129 Each of the three fetal protection policy cases to reach the appellate court level
before 1985 either held or stated in dicta that the use of the business necessity defense
on behalf of the employer was appropriate in fetal protection policy cases. See Wright,
697 F.2d at 1185; Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552; Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d
986 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that although the business necessity defense could have
been applicable to the defendant's situation, the plaintiff successfully proved that the
defendant's fetal protection policy was a pretext for sex discrimination, thereby obviat-
ing the need for a disparate impact/business necessity analysis). The Hayes court was
the only one to break new ground and hold that the employer may use a concern which
is not directly business related to justify a business necessity defense. Prior to Hayes,
courts had held that policies which protected the health of a woman could not bejusti-
fied under the business necessity defense because it was "the purpose of Title VII to
allow the individual woman to make [the] choice for herself." Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).
An excellent example of the use of this rationale is the Fifth Circuit decision in
Burwell. See supra note 24. The court in Burwell held that a defendant-airline company
was not allowed to factor in concerns for the safety of a pregnant woman or her fetus in
its decision to ground pregnant flight attendants. The only legitimate employer concern
which could be factored into the business necessity defense was the safety of the airline's
passengers. Burwell, 633 F.2d at 371. This rationale explains the bizarre reasoning of
the court in Wright. Like the court in Burwell, the Wright court held that the only legiti-
mate defendant concerns under the business necessity defense were concerns regarding
the safety of the defendant's customers. Consequently, the court drew an analogy be-
tween fetuses and an employer's customers by labeling them both "invitees" or "licen-
sees," thus holding that both groups could be protected by the employer as a business
necessity. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
In addition to the business necessity concerns regarding safety, the courts have dis-
cussed the employer concern over potential tort liability as a legitimate factor in the
business necessity defense. The court in Zuniga mentioned this concern, stating in dicta
that "the economic consequences of a tort suit brought against the Hospital by a con-
genitally malformed child could be financially devastating, severely disrupting the 'safe
and efficient operation of the business.'" Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992 n.10. The Hayes
court, however, rejected this rationale, stating that "[w]e cannot accept the Hospital's
contention that potential litigation costs can form the basis for the business necessity it
asserts.... In sum, we believe that potential liability is too contingent and too broad a
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and the majority opinions use a form of "result-oriented gimmick-
ery," 13 0 in the words of a dissenting judge in Johnson Controls.
3. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
In 1982, Johnson Controls, a major producer of batteries, insti-
tuted a fetal protection policy 31 designed to keep all fertile women
out of workplace areas which exposed employees to excessive levels
of lead.' 3 2 Union members and individual employees brought suit
against the employer, alleging that the exclusionary policy violated
their rights under Title VII. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant corporation, and the plaintiffs
appealed. 133 The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, voted seven to
four to affirm the district court in what dissentingJudge Easterbrook
stated "is likely the most important sex-discrimination case in any
court since 1964 . .. .,134
a. Majority
The opinion began by discussing the scientific data covering
toxic substances at the workplace. Both parties admitted that mater-
nal exposure to lead poses a major health hazard to a developing
factor to amount to a 'business necessity.'" Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553 n.15. The court in
Wright also implicitly rejected the potential liability argument, citing City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), for the proposition that an
employer policy set up for the purpose of avoiding potential liability and consequent
economic damage is not enough to justify a business necessity. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1190
n.26. In addition, in his dissent in Johnson Controls, Judge Easterbrook noted that it is
illegal to discriminate against women workers on the grounds that their benefit plans are
too costly. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 914 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Man-
hart, 435 U.S. at 702. Consequently, if employment costs do not justify employment
discrimination, Easterbrook asks "how may the prospect of tort judgments do so? Title
VII applies even when---especially when-discrimination is rational as the employer sees
things." Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 914 (Easterbrook,J. dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal). For further discussion regarding the employer's potential tort liability, see supra
text accompanying notes 72-92.
130 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
131 The policy applies to all work areas in which employees have had blood lead
levels of 30 pg/dl or more in the past year. The OSHA standard for blood lead levels is a
maximum of 50 pg/ml before a company must transfer an employee. It should be
noted, however, that there is strong evidence that blood lead levels far below that stan-
dard still may have a detrimental effect on a developing fetus. "Since the growing brain
of the fetus is likely to be at least as sensitive to the neurologic balance of lead as the
brain of a young child, umbilical cord blood levels should be at least below [L25 g/dl."
Id at 880 & n.19 (quoting Center for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children 7, 20-21 (1985) (emphasis
omitted).
132 For a discussion of the effects of lead on the reproductive system and offspring of
workers, see supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
133 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 874.
134 Id. at 920.
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fetus. 35 The court also noted that because of the tendency of the
body to store excess lead in its system for a long period of time, the
"danger resulting from lead exposure cannot simply be avoided
through removing a pregnant woman from lead exposure promptly
after the discovery of pregnancy."' 3 6 Because of this phenomenon,
Johnson Controls asserted that it could not provide an alternative
policy which would adequately protect a fetus from the hazards of
lead exposure.
In its analysis of the problem, the court looked first to the Title
VII tests applied by the appellate courts in Olin and Hayes. The
court found that:
[a]lthough Olin and Hayes present somewhat different analyses,
both cases, in essence, determine that a business necessity defense
in a fetal protection policy case requires (1) a demonstration of
the existence of a substantial health risk to the unborn child, and
(2) establishment that transmission of the hazard to the unborn
child occurs only through women.137
The court also noted that the plaintiff may rebut the necessity of the
fetal protection policy by presenting evidence of "less discrimina-
tory alternatives equally capable of preventing the health hazard to
the unbom."'138 The majority agreed the business necessity defense
may be applied in a fetal protection policy case, as it "balance[s] the
interests of the employer, the employee, and the unborn child in a
manner consistent with Title VII."'13 9 The court then proceeded to
apply the disparate impact/business necessity analysis in a different
manner from both the Wright and the Hayes courts.
The Johnson Controls court began its analysis by citing Wards
Cove, the 1989 case which held that the plaintiff must bear the bur-
den of proof throughout a disparate impact/business necessity de-
fense case. 140 Under Wards Cove, a defendant need only produce
evidence of a legitimate business necessity to justify a policy; the
plaintiff must bear the burden of proving "that it was 'because of
such individual's race, color,' etc., that he was denied a desired em-
ployment opportunity."' 14 1 The court in Johnson Controls took this
burden-of-proof scenario, applied it to the facts at hand, and
granted summary judgment for the defendant. The court phrased
135 Id. at 879.
136 Id. at 881.
137 Id. at 885.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 886.
140 For a discussion of Wards Cove and its effect on Title VII jurisprudence, see supra
text accompanying notes 25-40.
141 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 887 (quoting Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126
(1989) (citations omitted)).
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the issue by stating that "the question we must address is whether
the UAW, which bears the burden of persuasion, has presented evi-
dence sufficient to permit the district court to conclude thatJohnson
Controls' business necessity defense cannot be factually sup-
ported." 142 The court then analyzed the facts presented by the
plaintiffs and concluded that "the UAW has not met its evidentiary
burden... of presenting facts from which a trier of fact could deter-
mine that an alternative policy would be equally as effective as John-
son Controls' fetal protection policy in preventing risk of harm to
unborn children from lead exposure."' 143
After deciding that the case should be dismissed on summary
judgment on the test of the business necessity defense alone, the
majority then stepped beyond the boundaries set by both the Olin
and Hayes courts. Stating that "we are also convinced that Johnson
Controls' fetal protection policy could be upheld under the bona
fide occupational qualification defense,"' 144 the majority applied a
disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis.' 45 Ignoring the fact that the
BFOQdefense had always had an extremely narrow definition which
considered only the worker's actual ability to do the job, 146 the ma-
jority went ahead and factored the health of a potential fetus into
the test and declared that Johnson Controls' policy of barring all
fertile women satisfied the requirements of the BFOQ 47
b. Dissent
The dissent vehemently attacked both the majority's reasoning
and result. The use of Wards Cove to dismiss the case on summary
judgment especially concerned the dissentingjudges. As dissenting
Judge Posner wrote:
[a] reader of the majority opinion might be excused for thinking
that the case had been fully tried . . .rather than decided by a
district judge on a motion for summaryjudgment. I think it a mis-
take to suppose that we can decide this case once and for all on so
142 Id. at 888.
143 Id. at 893.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977); Torres v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1537 (1989). As the dissent stated, "sex is a BFOQwhen its use is 'reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of [the employer's] particular business' (the BFOQ rule), and
employers must treat men and pregnant women equally with respect to their 'ability or
inability to work' (the PDA). Risk to fetuses falls outside these rules." Johnson Controls,
886 F.2d at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). For discussion of the narrow definition of
the BFOQ defense, see supra text accompanying notes 14-17, and infra text accompany-
ing notes 176-81.
147 id. at 901.
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meager a record.148
All four dissenting judges lamented the disintegration of Title VII
jurisprudence, disagreeing with the majority's decision to apply the
disparate impact/business necessity defense to a facially discrimina-
tory policy.1 49 The four dissenters disagreed amongst themselves as
to the applicability of the disparate treatment/BFOQ defense. 150
Judge Posner and Judge Cudahy felt that the only applicable analy-
sis of Johnson's facially discriminatory policy was the disparate
treatment/BFOQ test. Judge Easterbrook (joined by Judge Flaum)
agreed, but unlike Judge Posner he believed that the stringent
BFOQ standard could not be met by a defendant in a fetal protec-
tion policy case. 15 1
Judge Easterbrook filed the most vigorous of the three dissent-
ing opinions.' 5 2 Besides attacking the majority's Title VII jurispru-
dence (the focal point ofJudge Posner's dissent), Judge Easterbrook
attacked the main premise underlying the majority's reasoning: that
the only acceptable level of fetal risk is zero, and that discrimination
based on sex is an acceptable means to reach that level.
The question is whether a justification of a particular kind is an
acceptable defense of sex discrimination. This justification is not.
No legal or ethical principle compels or allows Johnson to assume
that woman are less able than men to make intelligent decisions
148 Id. at 902 (Posner, J., dissenting).
149 Under Title VII law, an employer's facially discriminatory policy should be ana-
lyzed under the disparate treatment model and can only be justified by a BFOQdefense.
For a brief discussion of the disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses, see supra
text accompanying notes 13-19.
The majority justified its contortion of Title VII law by citing the law's "flexibility."
Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 899-901. The dissent replied by stating that "[n]o amount
of 'flexibility'justifies sex discrimination without a BFOQ, unless by 'flexibility' we mean
a prerogative to disregard the statute when it requires decisions antithetical to our be-
liefs." Id. at 920 (Posner, J., dissenting). Amazingly enough, the majority decision did
not even mention the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982),
which, as Judge Easterbrook wrote, "puts out of bounds the justifications Johnson of-
fers." Id. at 912. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy or related medical conditions. For a discussion of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, see supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
150 For a discussion of the business necessity and BFOQ defenses under Title VII,
see supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
151 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 909 (noting that the PDA demands "that women and
men who are 'similar in their ability or inability to work' must be treated the same. A
court's belief that a good end is in view does not justify departure from the statutory
framework; it is an occasion for applying the statutory framework."). Judge Easterbrook
went on to state that "[i]f the rigors of the BFOQsuggest the need for a fresh approach,
that is a job for another branch." Id. at 910.
152 Easterbrook's dissent was joined in full by Judge Flaum and joined in part by
Judge Cudahy, who stated: "I would be pleased to join almost all of Judge Easter-
brook's eloquent dissent except for its disposition of the case." Id. at 901. (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
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about the welfare of the next generation, that the interests of the
next generation always trump the interests of living women, and
that the only acceptable level of risk is zero. "[Tlhe purpose of
Title VII is to allow the individual woman to make that choice for
herself."153
Easterbrook noted that "[m]ost women in an industrial labor
force do not become pregnant.... Concerns about a tiny minority
of women cannot set the standard by which all are judged."' 54 Be-
sides the low percentage of pregnancies in industrial workplaces,
the unknown levels of fetal risk also concerned Judge Easterbrook.
He stated that "[a] small risk, even if compellingly documented, is
not enough to exclude women from employment.... [I]s the risk
one learning disability in two pregnancies? One in two thousand?
One in two million? These figures imply different policies, yet we
do not know which is correct."155
In accord with both the Wright decision and the Hayes deci-
sions,1 56 Judge Easterbrook rejected Johnson Controls's argument
that costs of potential tort liability justified its exclusionary policy.
Assuming that the prospect of tort judgments would mean that the
average cost of employing females would be higher than the average
cost of employing males, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that "Title
VII requires employers to deal with individual employees rather
than with group averages."' 57 He then noted the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Manhart 5 8 and asserted that em-
ployers may not exclude women "by saying that higher costs of pen-
sions and health care made them too costly. If these costs do not
establish a BFOQ ... even in principle, how may the prospect of
153 Id. at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321,335 (1977)).
154 Id (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the likelihood of a working woman
becoming pregnant, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
155 Id. at 916. Easterbrook continued:
How does the risk attributable to lead compare, say, to the risk to the
next generation created by driving a taxi? A female bus or taxi driver is
exposed to noxious fumes and the risk of accidents, all hazardous to a
child she carries. Would it follow that taxi and bus companies can decline
to hire women? That an employer could forbid pregnant employees to
drive cars, because of the risk accidents pose to fetuses? For all we can
tell, accepting Johnson's argument compels us to answer "yes" to these
questions.
Id. at 917 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 102-30.
157 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 914 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
158 City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(striking down an employer pension plan charging women higher monthly premiums
than men because women as a class live longer). The Supreme Court held that general-
izations about a class are not an acceptable means for discrimination, and that the policy
of Title VII requires courts to focus on fairness to individuals, not fairness to classes.
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tort judgments do so? Title VII applies even when-especially
when-discrimination is rational as the employer sees things." 15 9
Judge Easterbrook recognized the risk of potential harm to fe-
tuses inherent in allowing women free choice in the workplace, 160
but he realized that this risk is not one that women alone should
have to bear. He wrote:
Risk to the next generation is incident to all activity, starting with
getting out of bed. (Staying in bed all day has its own hazards.)
To insist on zero risk, which the court says Johnson may do, is to
exclude women from the industrial jobs that have been a male
preserve. By all means let society bend its energies to improving
the prospects of those who come after us. Demanding zero risk
produces not progress but paralysis .... Laudable though its
objectives be, Johnson may not reach its goal at the expense of
women.'61
III
ANALYSIS
A. Problems With the Use of Title VII in Fetal Protection
Policy Cases: The Argument Between Disparate
Treatment and Disparate Impact
Title VII jurisprudence is inadequate for the analysis of fetal
protection policies. Under Title VII, as amended by the PDA, an
159 Id. at 914 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
160 In an amusing aside, Judge Easterbrook noted that individuals are not necessar-
ily the more informed decisionmakers. He cited scientific data surveys which concluded
that:
93-95% of the adult population is scientifically illiterate. "Asked whether
the Earth goes around the Sun or the Sun around the Earth, 21 percent
replied incorrectly; 7 percent said they did not know.... On other ques-
tions, the survey found that 43 percent said correctly that electrons,
which are components of atoms, are smaller than atoms; 20 percent said
they were larger and 37 percent said they did not know which was
larger.... Of those surveyed, 76 percent answered correctly that light
travels faster than sound; 19 percent mistakenly said that sound moves
faster." New York Times, Oct. 25, 1988, § C p. 10 col. 4. The state of
knowledge may be even worse in the United Kingdom: "Only 34% of
Britons know that the earth goes around the sun (rather than vice versa)
and that it takes a year to do so. Almost one-fifth are presumably busy
nailing their furniture to the floor as they imagine themselves hurtling
around the sun once a day. And they are confused about what the uni-
verse is: given a list comprising solar system, galaxy, earth, universe, and
sun, only 53% thought that the universe was the largest item. Some 7%
thought that the earth was. Asked if nuclear-power stations cause acid
rain, almost half the respondents said yes, and only 34% knew that they
did not .... So much for environmental awareness .... Some people
seem unworried by radiation: 13% think that radioactive milk can be
made safe by boiling it." The Economist, July 15, 1989, p. 84 col. 2.
Id. at 914 n.6 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 920-21 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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employer may not discriminate against a woman based upon her
ability to become pregnant. 162 Any employer fetal protection policy
that singles out women can be challenged by disparate treatment
analysis and can only be defended by a BFOQ. The statutory BFOQ
defense available under Title VII by definition must relate to the
actual ability of an employee to perform a job. The BFOQ formula
considers only the effect on the employer's business; the effect on an
unrelated third party is irrelevant. As one scholar wrote, "[t]he inci-
dental harm to the worker or the worker's family is irrelevant, unless
it has a substantial detrimental impact on job performance." 163
Judge Tuttle stated in Hayes that "the BFOQ defense is available
only when the employer can show that the excluded class is unable
to perform the duties that constitute the essence of the job....
Therefore, under traditional BFOQ analysis, the defense is inappli-
cable to this case."' 164 Courts and scholars have generally agreed
that the BFOQdefense, as currently interpreted, is not applicable to
the fetal protection policy situation. 165
1. Disparate Impact/Business Necessity
In an attempt to work out a much needed compromise between
plaintiff-workers and defendant-employees, courts in the past by-
passed the disparate treatment analysis and contorted Title VII law
by analyzing the policies under the disparate impact/business neces-
sity theory. 166 By doing so, the courts ignored the plain meaning
and the legislative history of both Title VII and the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act. 167 Even though the courts undermined the staunch
162 For a discussion of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 41-48.
163 Furnish, supra note 4, at 93.
164 Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11 th Cir. 1984).
165 See EEOC: POLICY STATEMENT ON REPRODUCTIVE AND FETAL HAZARDS UNDER TI-
TLE VII n.10 (Oct. 3, 1988) [hereinafter EEOC: PoLIcY STATEMENT] ("[Tihe Hayes and
Wright courts concluded that BFOQis not generally applicable in fetal protection cases
because it is a narrow exception which applies only in a situation where all or substan-
tially all members of a protected class are actually unable to perform the duties of the
job in question. Commentators, too, have been reluctant to interpret the exception
more expansively.") One commentator stated that although the exact parameters of the
BFOQ defense intended by Congress are unclear, it is "unlikely that the BFOQ provi-
sion was intended to permit widespread discrimination on the basis of sex." Becker,
supra note 4, at 1251. But see infra text accompanying notes 173-76 for the EEOC's cur-
rent position regarding the BFOQ defense.
166 For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 102-30.
167 The House Report on the PDA amendment noted that:
the assumption that women will become pregnant have [sic] leave the
labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the
root of the discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and
dead-end jobs. H.R. 6075 unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination
includes discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifically defines stan-
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protection Congress provided to working women through Title VII,
however, they still maintained strong pressure on defendant-
employers by requiring them to produce scientific proof to justify
their exclusionary policies.168
The majority in Johnson Controls changed this scenario when it
applied the disparate impact analysis outlined by the Supreme
Court in Wards Cove, shifting the burden of proof from the defend-
ant to the plaintiff.169 Now, the employer need only articulate a le-
gitimate defense for establishing a fetal protection policy; the
employee must then prove that such a policy is not needed. This
makes the job more difficult for plaintiffs as scientific information
regarding fetal hazards is more readily available to an employer,
placing an employee-plaintiff at a distinct disadvantage. 70 By re-
quiring the plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof in a case where the
defendant has enacted a facially discriminatory policy, the Johnson
Controls court contorted Title VII law and its defenses and under-
mined protections provided to women against discrimination. As
dards which require that pregnant workers be treated the same as other
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 43, at 3; see also Becker, supra note 4, at 1254 (citing the
legislative history to support the proposition that the plain language and the legislative
history of the PDA provide support for the view that Congress intended no job discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex); supra text accompanying notes 41-48 (discussing the PDA).
168 In other words, although courts have allowed employers to justify exclusionary
policies through the business necessity defense, they have always required the employer to
provide the necessary scientific information which justifies that policy. According to
both the Wright and Hayes courts, employers must demonstrate the risk through "objec-
tive evidence of an essentially scientific nature supported by the opinion evidence of
qualified experts in the relevant scientific fields." Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548. The EEOC
stated in October 1988 that "[ilt is the Commission's position that employers are pro-
hibited from establishing policies that exclude from the workplace members of one sex
but not the other because of a reproductive or fetal hazard, unless that policy can be
justified by reputable objective evidence of an essentially scientific nature." EEOC:
POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 165, at 5 (footnote omitted). The EEOC outlined the
three elements that the courts had required the employer prove. First, the employer
must show that there exists "a substantial risk of harm to employees' offspring through
the exposure of employees to a reproductive or fetal hazard in the workplace." Id. at 7.
Second, the employer must show that the harm of exposure affects only one sex and not
the other, and third, the employer must show that the exclusionary policy "effectively
eliminates the risk of fetal or reproductive harm." Id. (footnotes omitted). The Hayes
court further defined the proof requirements of the employer, stating that in order to
demonstrate substantial risk to one sex, an employer "must produce objective evidence
of an essentially scientific nature supported by the opinion evidence of qualified experts
in the relevant scientific fields." Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
169 For discussion of the Wards Cove decision, see supra text accompanying notes 25-
40.
170 By imposing virtually the entire burden of proof on women challenging these
discriminatory policies, plaintiffs now face the impossible task of demonstrating an alter-
native policy which "would be equally as effective . . . in preventing risk of harm to
unborn children from lead exposure" as a policy which outright excludes all fertile wo-
men. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 893.
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Judge Posner bluntly stated in his dissent in Johnson Controls, the
broad reading of the Title VII defenses given by the majority "gut[s]
the statute." 17 1 Earlier, scholars expressed concern over such an
erosion of Title VII law; as one author wrote, "[t]he vitality and co-
hesiveness of sex discrimination law would be ill-served by the crea-
tion of bad law in this highly technical and newly emerging area." 172
2. Disparate Treatment/BFOQ
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
issued an updated policy decision on January 26, 1990 in which it
condemned the majority decision in Johnson Controls and supported
the dissenting opinion by Judge Cudahy.' 73 The EEOC agreed with
the dissenters that a disparate treatment analysis was required, declar-
ing that fetal protection policies "are not neutral rules to which ad-
verse [disparate] impact analysis applies."' 74 The EEOC rejected
the burden-of-proof shift required by Wards Cove, stating that "poli-
cies which exclude only women constitute per se violations of Title
VII. For the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof in a case in which
there is direct evidence of a facially discriminatory policy is wholly
inconsistent with settled Title VII law."' 75 The EEOC then ap-
proved the use of the disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis, adopting
Judge Cudahy's position that an employer may legitimately include
risks to third parties or potential third parties in its BFOQ
defense. 176
If adopted, the EEOC's expanded interpretation of the BFOQ
defense still would undermine the statutory protections provided by
Title VII. The BFOQdefense provides that employers may discrim-
inate against employees "in those certain instances where religion,
171 Id. at 903 (Posner, J., dissenting).
172 Howard, supra note 4, at 835.
173 EEOC: Policy Guidance on Seventh Circuit Decision in United Auto Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 18 DAILY LAB. REPS. D-1 (JAN. 26, 1990).
174 Id. at 4.
17 Id. (emphasis added). The EEOC further noted that its change in position from
its October, 1988 policy statement (in which it approved of the use of the disparate
impact/business necessity analysis in fetal protection policy cases) was due to the major-
ity's application in Johnson Controls of the Wards Cove burden-of-proof scenario. The use
of Wards Cove convinced the Commission "that the hybrid approach to fetal protection
cases is problematic." Id. 18 D-1 at 5. For a discussion of the Wards Cove decision, see
supra text accompanying notes 25-40.
176 While this Note was in production, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
handed down a fetal protection policy case that adopted Judge Cudahy's interpretation
of the BFOQ defense. The court reversed a lower court decision that applied a dispa-
rate impact/business necessity test to a fetal protection policy at a General Motors plant.
The court then remanded the case, instructing the trial court to apply a disparate treat-
ment/BFOQtest that included consideration of a third party fetus. See Grant v. General
Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (1990).
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sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise."'' 77 Federal courts have interpreted the BFOQ nar-
rowly,' 78 allowing only a worker's actual ability to do the job' 79 or
the safety of an employer's customers to be legitimate factors in the
BFOQ formula.' 80 The BFOQ analysis precludes employers from
using cost considerations to perpetuate discriminatory polices.' 8 '
As Judge Easterbrook noted, "risk to fetuses falls outside these
rules."' 182 By reading fetal protection into the employer's statutory
defense under Title VII, courts will undermine the stringent protec-
tions provided to women workers by Title VII and the PDA. The
delicate balance required by the fetal protection policy issue de-
mands a statutory solution by the legislature.
B. Inadequacy of Other Federal Regulations
Much federal legislation currently in place relates to the safety
of fertile workers on the job, including the Occupational Safety and
Health Act ("OSHA") of 1970, and the Toxic Substance Control
Act ("TSCA") of 1976.183 Congress passed both Acts in an effort to
establish safe work environments for men and women everywhere.
An obvious response to the problem of fetal and reproductive tox-
ins would use these two laws to require employers to maintain work-
places which do not threaten the reproductive health of either men
or women. However, the solution is not so easy. Both OSHA and
the TSCA have met with limited success in effectively regulating
177 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
178 See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding that for a defendant to establish a BFOQ there must be "a factual basis
for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved."). For a discussion of the narrowness of the
BFOQ defense, see supra text accompanying notes 13-17 & 173-76.
179 See sources cited supra note 178.
180 See Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (mandatory retirement at
age 60 for airline pilots held to be a BFOQ in light of concerns for passenger safety).
181 City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(holding that additional cost to employer of women's retirement fund was not a legiti-
mate rationale for charging women more under the employer's retirement benefits pol-
icy). For an excellent discussion of the role of costs in employer Title VII defenses, see
Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
318 (1987).
182 Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 913 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). In addition, the
California Court of Appeal, addressing Johnson Control's fetal protection policy after
theJanuary 1990 EEOC guidelines were issued, agreed withJudge Easterbrook. There,
the court held that the facts in this case "do not satisfy the BFOQ test. There is no
evidence that fertile women cannot efficiently perform jobs involving contact with lead
at the Company's facilities .... The 'essence' of the business operation-making auto-
mative batteries-would not be undermined." Johnson Controls v. California Fair Emp.
& Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
183 Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 49, at 262.
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toxic exposure for workers.184 In addition, Congress designed
OSHA to protect workers themselves, not necessarily their off-
spring. Although healthy reproductive organs may be deemed a
necessary part of a safe and healthy worker, Congress passed OSHA
with the nonpregnant worker in mind. Overall, OSHA has proven
to be an ineffective means of dealing with hazards for workers, and
there is little hope of OSHA adequately coping with fetal protection
standards.18 5
The TSCA presents much the same picture as OSHA. This Act
makes a manufacturer responsible for testing the chemicals it pro-
duces; it then requires the information to be submitted to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Responsibility for the
development and enforcement of regulations of the chemicals falls
on the Administrator of the EPA. 186 One section refers to fetal
hazards, directing the Administrator to take action "to prevent or
reduce to a sufficient extent" potential risks that chemicals will pres-
ent "to human beings from cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects
.... ,187 However, as two commentators noted, even though the
TSCA "potentially provides an excellent mechanism for the control
of many serious reproductive hazards . . . [t]o date ... [the] EPA
has not invoked the provisions . . . for any suspected teratogen or
mutagen."188 This picture of nonenforcement is unlikely to change
184 Under OSHA, the Secretary of Labor has the authority to set standards "to the
extent feasible" so that "no employee will suffer material impairment of health or func-
tional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988). OSHA
also contains a "general duty clause," imposing a general duty on employers to "furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm .. " Id. § 654(a)(1) (1988). Both of these OSHA regulations are in reality much
weaker than they sound. For example, the Supreme Court held in the "Benzene Case,"
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), that for the
Secretary to pass a regulation regarding workplace safety standards, it first must prove
"on the basis of substantial evidence" that there is a "significant risk" from a particular
exposure level. Id. at 653. This level of proof is nearly impossible when little is known
regarding the effects of a toxic substance on adult men and women, and even less is
knovm of the substance's negative reproductive effects.
The general duty clause of OSHA also is not as protective as it might seem. Federal
courts have held that it requires only that "the employer do all it can feasibly do to
eliminate hazardous conditions and hazardous conduct of employees." Nothstein & Ay-
res, supra note 49, at 268; see id. at 274-80 (economic feasibility standards); id. at 281-86
(technological feasibilty standards). "Feasibility" as defined in relevant case law, in-
cludes both economic and technological considerations. Consequently, if removing fe-
tal toxics from the workplace is economically "infeasible," OSHA will not require it.
185 See Finley, supra note 4, at 16-12 to 16-14 ("the Occupational Safety and Health
Act itself does not provide an adequate solution to the dilemma of fetal protection
policies").
186 15 U.S.C. § 4(b)(3)(B) (1976); id. § 2603(b)(3) & (c) (1988).
187 Id. § 2603(f) (1988).
188 Ashford & Caldart, supra note 56, at 539.
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in the near future. Consequently, new federal legislation needs to
be enacted to address the conflict between the rights of fertile work-
ers and the health of the unborn.
C. Proposed Statute
The complex issues posed by the hazards to the offspring of
women working in toxic workplaces, and the threat posed to the job
opportunities of women everywhere, illuminate the need for federal
legislation both to protect the rights of women and to encourage
employers to establish rational policies. Federal legislation would
be subject to the influence of women's organizations and women
voters, allowing them a voice in policy formation. If employers are
left a free hand in fetal protection policy formation, they will design
policies which most efficiently meet their own needs, disregarding
social welfare concerns. Congressional legislation affords the op-
portunity to distribute the costs of protecting future generations eq-
uitably, relieving women of the need to bear the whole of such a
burden alone. 189
The statute begins with the presumption that both men and wo-
men have the right to make an iriformed decision regarding the en-
vironment in which they wish to work.' 90 The right to be informed
of all workplace hazards and potential effects correlates with the
present OSHA strategy of regulating toxic chemicals in the work-
place. As of May 1986, the federal government requires employers
to assess and label all chemicals in the workplace, warn employees
of different hazards, establish training programs to deal with
hazards, and inform employees of any and all measures which can
be taken to protect themselves from such hazards.191 The proposed
statute requires the warnings to include reproductive hazards.
The purpose behind this statutory proposal is to ensure that
workers of both sexes are fully informed of the potential risks to
reproductive health caused by exposure to hazardous substances at
the workplace. This statute recognizes that in many situations it is
technologically impossible or cost-prohibitive to eliminate all poten-
189 See Becker, supra note 4, at 1263.
190 Professor Becker cites an example from the Wright case in which the defendant-
Olin Corporation gave women written information about reproductive hazards associ-
ated with jobs entailing toxic exposure, and gave men oral notice of the same. As
Becker points out, "[t]his difference in treatment is not merely a formal violation of Title
VII. Written information can more easily be shared with one's spouse. And male work-
ers should be able to share information with their wives as female workers are able to
share information with their husbands." Becker, supra note 4, at 1262 n.188.
191 29 C.F.R. §§ 1900, 1200(h) (1989). Specific disclosure requirements are re-
quired for certain substances such as ionizing radiation, vinyl chloride and lead. See id.
§ 1910.96(i), § 1910.1017j) & § 1910.25(1), respectively.
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tial teratogens and mutagens from the workplace. Consequently,
the statute assumes that the choice regarding exposure to potential
fetal toxins is best left to the individual worker. Under this law, both
men and women have access to general information regarding po-
tential effects of exposure as well as access to information contained
in their personal medical files regarding their own current level of
exposure.
The statute requires an employer to transfer an employee out
of a hazardous work area upon the request of that employee. The
statute does not require the employer to maintain that employee's
wage rate, nor does it mandate that an employer create additional
positions or terminate other workers in order to accommodate the
transferring employee. What the policy does do is allow an employee
to control his or her toxic exposure level by attempting to ensure
some degree of job flexibility in light of personal reproductive
plans.
This statute is not intended to be a complete solution to the
complex and serious problem of toxic substances at the workplace.
Ideally, OSHA and the EPA (as empowered by the TSCA) should
pass tougher regulations and vigorously enforce both new and ex-
isting standards in order to reduce the amount of toxic exposure at
the workplace. Until such ideals become reality, however, this stat-
ute ensures that job opportunities for women are not sacrificed in
the name of fetal protection.
STATUTE
§ 1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this statute is to allow all workers the opportunity to
make informed decisions regarding their workplace environment
and reproductive health.
§ 2 DEFINrIONS
For the purpose of this Part, the following terms shall have the defi-
nitions as ascribed below unless the context indicates otherwise:
(1) "Employer" means a person or corporation engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more em-
ployees for each working calendar week in the current or
preceding calendar year.
(2) "Employment Agency" means any person or corporation
regularly undertaking, with or without compensation, to
procure employment for any person and includes an agent
of such an agency.
(3) "Employee" means an individual employed by any em-
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ployer including full-time, part-time, and independent
contractors.
(4) "Fertility" means the ability of any person, male or female,
to produce offspring.
§ 3 PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON FERTILITY;
EXCEPTIONS
A. It is unlawful for an employer to:
(1) Fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment because of such individual's fertility.
(2) Limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
or her status as an employee because of such individual's
fertility.
(3) Condition employment or continued employment based
on acceptance of or transfer to less hazardous positions.
(4) Reduce the wage of any employee in order to comply with
this part.
B. It is unlawful for an employment agency to fail: (1) to refer, (2)
to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis
of that individual's fertility or infertility or to refuse to refer for
employment, (3) or otherwise to discriminate against, any indi-
vidual because of such individual's fertility.
C. It is unlawful for a labor organization to:
(1) Exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise dis-
criminate against, any individual because of that individ-
ual's fertility status.
(2) Limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify
or fail to refer or refuse to refer for employment any indi-
vidual, in any way, which would deprive or tend to deprive
that any individual of employment opportunities, or limit
such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his or her status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, solely on the basis of such individual's fertil-
ity or infertility. 0,
(3) Cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this Act.
D. It is unlawful for any employer to refuse to transfer an em-
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ployee, temporarily or otherwise, to a less hazardous position
when such employee has requested a transfer for reasons relat-
ing to fertility, provided, however, that no employer shall be
required by this Section to create additional employment which
the employer would not otherwise have created, nor shall such
employer be required to discharge any employee, transfer any
employee with more seniority, or promote any employee who is
not qualified to perform thejob. Such a transfer shall not entail
a loss of seniority or benefits; it may, however, entail a reduc-
tion in wages, provided that this reduction is normal for a new
job, and decreased, in whole or part, by the employee's transfer
request.
E. This Act shall not apply to employers who refuse to hire preg-
nant applicants who wish to work in a toxic area and who are
knowingly pregnant at the time that they apply for such
position.
F. This Act shall not be construed to interfere with or pre-empt
any state or federal statutory prohibitions of sex discrimination
or any state or federal regulations of maternity or paternity
leave policies.
§ 4 MANDATORY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION REGARDING
REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS; WAIVERS
A. Employers shall inform, both verbally and in writing, all em-
ployees of any possible dangers or effects that the employer
knows of or should know of from all potential reproductive
hazards existing in their relevant workplace.
(1) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to override existing
OSHA regulations regarding employee notification, edu-
cation, and training requirements.
(2) Employees shall be allowed full access to any available in-
formation regarding reproductive hazards, including ac-
cess to such employee's personal medical records within a
reasonable time after request, not to exceed 30 days.
B. Employers, at their discretion, may require waivers from any
employee who wishes to work in an area deemed hazardous to
reproductive health, providing that such employee has a full
working knowledge of the potential hazards existing at the job
area, such employee is subjected to yearly physical checkups
and monthly toxic blood-level monitoring, such employee is
fully informed of the results of such checkups and monitoring,
and such employee is cognizant of the rights so waived.
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(1) Such waiver may include a provision waiving employer tort
liability for all damages to the health of a parent or the
health of a fetus, except that no right or remedy under a
state worker's compensation statute shall be waived. Any
section or part of such waiver waiving employer liability
for gross, wanton, or willful negligence shall be herein in-
valid, although in such a case all remaining parts of such
waiver shall remain valid.
(2) Such a waiver shall be held invalid in its entirety if all other
requirements under this Act are not met.
§ 5 CIVIL Surr AUTHORIZED
A. Any person aggrieved under this Act may bring a civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable
relief as will effectuate the purposes of this Act.
B. Any relief granted by the court shall be limited to declaratory
and injunctive relief, except in the case of employer fraud, in-
cluding orders to hire or reinstate an aggrieved person or admit
such person to a labor organization. In a civil action brought to
enforce the provisions of this Act relating to employment, the
court may order back pay.
§ 6 NOTICES TO BE POSTED
Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization
shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises
a notice setting forth information to effectuate the purposes of this
Act.
Pendleton Elizabeth Hamlet
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